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Report 11 Two-State
Solution

أنت الزائر رقم:

The
Challenge to the Two-State Solution

Gary Sussman

(Gary
Sussman is based at
Tel
Aviv
University.)

Ariel Sharon’s push for unilateral Israeli
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and four forlorn
West
Bank settlements
in the spring of 2004 came after a year of mounting
criticism inside and
outside Israel that he had no long-term “solution” for
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As the prime minister
conceded, his scheme was designed to forestall solutions
brokered by international actors, as well as locally
engineered initiatives, like the Geneva Accord of November
2003, that would implement a two-state solution based upon the
last formulas discussed by Israeli and Palestinian negotiators
at Taba in January 2001.

To read this article in Arabic
just click here
Mrs. Safaa Al-Khasawnah contributed her own
translation for this article to be published in both Al-Anbat
daily and in Originality Movement
site.

The wall in Abu Dis. (Uriel Sinai/Getty Images)

With disengagement,
Sharon seeks to exploit the perception that
there is no Palestinian partner for negotiations, and to
impose Israel’s power on the weaker party. The
Sharon plan was rejected in a poorly attended
Likud Party referendum on May 2,
2004, but outside
the settler right wing, unilateral withdrawal enjoys wide
support among the Israeli Jewish public. This support is drawn
from deeper springs than the traditional split between the
Likud right and the Labor Party center over the concept of
trading land for peace. Talk
of disengagement obscured the growing face debate, during 2003
and 2004, over alternatives to the two-state model—a discourse
that increasingly has tested the long-standing conventional
wisdom that the two-state solution is “the only game in
town.”[1] Purveyors of conventional
wisdom took note. In October 2003, the editors of the New
York Times described arguments against the two-state
solution as “insidious,” but acknowledged that they were
gaining ground. In the same month, the state-controlled Israel
Broadcast Authority’s prestigious “Popolitika” program hosted
a debate on the continuing viability of the two-state
solution. Research published by the liberal Israeli daily
Haaretz suggests that 67 percent of the Israeli public

“strongly or moderately fear” a scenario in which
Israel finds itself in a one-state reality.[2]

Two
alternatives to the two-state endgame are discussed. One is a
binational state, offering power-sharing to two separate
peoples with distinct collective identities within one polity.
The binational model encompasses federal, confederal and
consociational variants. The second alternative proposes a
single democratic polity, where there is no ethnic or national
distinction between citizens. Whereas the former alternative
is premised on collective entitlements, as developed in the
Good Friday Agreement in
Northern
Ireland, the latter is premised on individual
rights, as in post-apartheid
South
Africa. The two concepts are often used
interchangeably, and the word “binational” is understood by
most Israelis to denote the South African endgame. Some, like
Meron Benvenisti, suggest that the conflation of terminology
is designed to “prevent any debate about…attractive
alternatives” to the two-state solution.[3]

There are, of course, other alternatives
to a two-state outcome. These include an entity in which Jews
rule over a Palestinian majority, through various schemes of
coercion. The Israeli right has variously proposed canton
schemes which will allow a Jewish minority to rule over a
Palestinian majority through gerrymandering or a model in
which Palestinians exercise their political rights in Jordan
and Egypt. Others fear that Sharon and the Israeli right wish to create a
set of disconnected cantons that would bear the name of
“Palestinian state.” Such a “bantustan” model would maximize
Israeli control of territory, while minimizing the number of
Palestinians living in the Israeli state. In this climate, how
did the first two alternatives to the two-state solution come
to return from their banishment to the margins?

International Doubters

In the international community, by far
the most forthright opposition to the two-state solution comes
from the intellectual left, with its antipathy for nationalism
and ethnic states. It is held that Zionism is a discriminatory
ideology and that Israel is an inherently inequitable state.[4]

Many Israelis view these arguments as
fundamentally anti-Semitic, because
Israel is singled out for condemnation as a
nation-state, or because
Israel is singled out for condemnation as an
occupying power, while
China’s occupation of
Tibet and
Russia’s anti-separatist war in
Chechnya attract less attention. The
Oslo “peace process” of the 1990s
dramatically weakened the impact of anti-Zionist leftists on
public discourse, and some abandoned their opposition to
Zionism in the hope that the Oslo process—which tacitly envisioned two
states—would work, and on the assumption that both peoples
desired such a deal. The collapse of
Oslo has encouraged the intellectual left to
argue anew that a binational state is not only likely, but
desirable. Tony Judt stirred a major uproar when he recently
noted that, “The very idea of a ‘Jewish state’—a state in
which Jews and the Jewish religion have exclusive privileges
from which non-Jewish citizens are forever excluded—is rooted
in another time and place.
Israel, in short, is an anachronism.”[5] Judt’s submission
elicited thousands of letters to the editor, confirming Daniel
Lazare’s assessment that a “long-standing taboo has finally
begun to fall.”[6] That taboo inhibits
debate in the US over the legitimacy of a Jewish state.

Over the ensuing months, writers
who believe that a two-state solution is simply impracticable
have joined the band of two-state doubters. Veteran journalist
Helena Cobban, who reversed her earlier opposition to a
one-state outcome, provides one example.[7] Even before the spate of
articles in highbrow publications, diplomats engaged in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict also raised doubts over the
viability of a two-state solution, despite the fact that the
international community invested vast resources in the
Oslo process and, now, the “road map.” For
instance, in 2002 the UN secretary-general’s special envoy to
the Middle
East, Terje
Roed-Larsen, asked whether the UN was “nearing the death of
the two-state solution, the bedrock for all our peacemaking
efforts?”[8] These misgivings stem
from the political impasse, not an ideological preference.

Intellectually, the renewed opposition to
the notion of ethnically exclusive states must be seen against
the backdrop of the bloody conflicts of post-Communist
Eastern
Europe,
especially the Balkans, deepening and widening European
integration and opposition to “clash of civilizations” theory.
Israel’s violations of human rights in the
Occupied Territories have also eroded support for
Israel and its legitimacy, particularly in
Europe. In a Europe-wide survey conducted in
November 2003, a whopping 59 percent of respondents ranked
Israel ahead of the
US,
Iraq,
North
Korea and
Iran as the greatest perceived threat to world
stability. Though many Israelis quickly dismissed these
results as evidence of anti-Semitism, Eliahu Salpeter notes
that it was Israel and the Jews who “determined that Israel
should be a light unto the nations”[9]—

Wall art in Israel.
(Eddie Gerald)

hence they
are judged by the moral standards they claim. If
Israel has so far won the war of images in the
US, one Jewish American leader, Brian Lurie,
cautions that if the intifada does not end soon,
“Israel is liable to end its preferential
standing in  American
public opinion.”[10]

Israeli Doubts

Doubts
over a two-state outcome are also, increasingly, being
articulated in Israeli discourse. One prominent supporter of
the two-state outcome who has raised his concerns is Yossi
Alpher. Alpher warns that the two-state solution should not
“be taken for granted.”[11] Daniel Gavron has gone one step
further, advocating that Israeli Jews embrace a binational
state while they still enjoy demographic ascendancy. Gavron, a
Zionist, notes that having concluded that partition is no
longer possible, “we are left with only one alternative:
Israeli-Palestinian coexistence in one nation.”[12] Gavron’s idea enjoys scant
support among Jewish Israelis; 78 percent of them oppose such
an entity,[13] which they view as a recipe for
a “Greater Palestine.” But the binational idea is rooted in
Zionist discourse. In mandatory Palestine the likes of Henrietta Szold, Martin
Buber, Judah Magnes and the Hashomer Hatzair movement
propagated it. Though vilified in Zionist historiography for
their views, they were not alone.

Prominent Zionist leaders like Chaim
Weizmann and Chaim Arlozoroff supported the idea. David Ben
Gurion, the first prime minister of
Israel, toyed with binational ideas between 1924
and 1939, probably for tactical purposes. At a time when Jews
were a minority (less than 20 percent) in the territory of
mandatory Palestine, he surmised that the Zionists were too
weak to take on both the British and the Arabs. Moreover, the
demand for parity in political representation, implicit in the
rally for binationalism, clearly served the Zionist movement.
On the one hand, it would have ensured over-representation for
Jews in the mandate’s political institutions. On the other
hand, it allowed the Zionist leadership to maintain ambiguity
about its real intention to create a Jewish state. But the
Peel Commission rejected the cantonization proposed by the
Zionist movement, and this development, coupled with the
plight of the Jews in Europe and Ben Gurion’s pessimism that an
accommodation with Arab leaders was possible, led him to
abandon the binational idea.[14]After independence,
Israeli support for binationalism declined.
On the other
end of the Israeli political spectrum, elements in the
ideological right and the settler movement actively pursue a
single state. In opposition to “disengagement,” some of
Sharon’s right-wing detractors have openly
called for annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while maintaining the
Jewish nature of the state. The implication is that the Jewish
state would need to construct institutions that formally
discriminate in favor of Jews, or engage in ethnic cleansing.
As the Hebron settler leader

Noam Arnon has argued, “if there is
a contradiction between this [Jewish] essence and the
character of the government [democracy], it is clear that the
essence takes precedence.”[15]

In revealing newspaper interviews, Effi
Eitam, leader of the National Religious Party and a minister
in the Sharon government, laid out his vision for a
Greater Israel. Eitam noted that the “only Jewish state in the
world requires a minimum of territory.” Regarding those
Palestinians who wish to remain in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Eitam suggested that
Israel offer them “enlightened residency,” as
opposed to citizenship. Those unwilling to accept this status
would have to relocate.[16] Some on the right
propose leaving Palestinian areas under Israeli security
control, yet allowing Palestinians municipal autonomy. Another
version of the Greater Israel concept proposes that the entire
geographical area west of the
Jordan be divided into ten cantons, eight
Israeli and two Palestinian, with each canton given the same
representation in the Knesset, thereby guaranteeing a Jewish
majority. Many Israeli commentators hold that the settler
movement and its supporters are endangering
Israel by rendering a binational state more
likely.[17]

The Palestinians

Until 1988, advocacy for a “secular
Palestine” was the traditional position of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), though Israelis
viewed support for this idea as tactical, rather than
ideological. After the Oslo accord of 1993, diaspora intellectuals,
most notably the late Edward W. Said,carried the banner of
opposition to separation. Many of these standpatters feel
vindicated by the current state of affairs. More importantly,
leaders inside the Palestinian territories have come to
propose alternatives to the two-state solution. The most
important of these voices has been
Birzeit University’s Ali Jarbawi, who has long argued that
the Palestinians should serve
Israel an ultimatum demanding that it agree to
a Palestinian state within six months, after which the
Palestinians would demand annexation.[18] The idea has gradually
gained currency as the stalemate continues. The first
prominent Fatah leader to sound a warning that time is running
out for this accommodation was Marwan Barghouti, general
secretary of Fatah in the West Bank. Speaking at the close of his trial on
charges including murder and conspiracy, he cautioned: “I hope
the Israelis have learned that the Palestinian people cannot
be brought to yield with force. If an occupation does not end
unilaterally or through negotiations then there is only one
solution—one state for two peoples.”[19]
Thus far, the Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership has
largely refrained from dabbling in this debate, underscoring
the growing gap between the street and the political elite.
One poll suggests that almost a third of ordinary Palestinians
support a binational outcome.[20] A notable voice for
alternatives to the two-state solution has been the
Negotiations Support Unit (NSU), a team of lawyers drafting
position papers and making maps for the PLO in preparation for
eventual final status talks.

NSU staffers, many of whom
are diaspora Palestinians, have submitted that the Palestinian
cause would be better served by a struggle for civil rights.
The first prominent PA official to warn that time for a
two-state accommodation is running out was the PA Minister of
Finance, Salam Fayyad. In a memorandum submitted to the Bush
administration in October 2002, he warned that Israeli
settlement expansion was undermining a future two-state
deal.[21] In December 2003, Prime
Minister Ahmad Qurei also sounded the warning after
Sharon announced that he was going to move
ahead with his unilateral disengagement plan at the annual
Herzliya conference. Qurei noted, “This is an apartheid
solution to put the Palestinians in cantons. Who can accept
this? We will go for a one-state solution.… There’s no other
solution. We will not hesitate to defend the right of our
people when we feel the very serious intention [of
Israel] to destroy these rights.”[22] Yasser Arafat soon
followed suit in an interview he granted to the
Guardian.[23] These warnings were,
however, largely dismissed as tactical by Israelis. The PA can
ill afford to abandon the two-state outcome, and thereby
forego the vast amounts of international aid that sustain its
large civil service.[24]

Facts on the Ground

But the most important reasons for the
challenge to the two-state solution relate to developments on
the ground, especially continued settlement expansion and the
construction of the “separation fence.” According to Amira
Hass, the pace of settlement expansion in the
Occupied Territories since 1993 has created the “geography of
a single state.”[25]

Peace
Now says that in 2003 the Israeli government published an
additional 1,627 tenders for new housing in the
West
Bank, a fact that
speaks volumes for Israel’s commitment to a sustainable two-state
outcome. The land grab, argues Meron Benvenisti, nurtures a
sense that the “connection between territory and ethnic
identity—which was applicable up to about 20 years ago—cannot
be implemented and any attempt to implement it will only
complicate the problem instead of solving it.”[26] Others simply doubt
whether Israel is willing or able to extricate itself
from the territories. Such doubts are not ungrounded. Eitam
confidently dismisses settlement removal: “Do you really think
that anyone is capable of dismantling Ariel, Kiryat Arba or
Karnei Shomron?”[27] The former head of the
army’s central command, Yitzhak Eitan, fears that dismantling
settlements will trigger a civil war, making the evacuation
near impossible.[28] The assassination of
former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 serves as
a striking reminder that many Israelis deny the right of a
democratic government to surrender land promised by God. The
Likud Central Committee’s vote against the creation of a
Palestinian state in May 2002, and the rank and file’s vote
against withdrawal from Gaza in May 2004, are more evidence of
Israel’s possible inability to deliver the two-state deal.
The second
major fact on the ground that nurtures pessimism regarding the
two-state outcome is the “separation fence.” Israeli
proponents of the barrier that
Israel is building in the
West
Bank argue that
it will create a de facto two-state solution, leading to the
inevitable evacuation of settlements lying to the east of its
route.

They further
believe that the route will “correct itself” over time.
Skeptics submit that far from enhancing the two-state
solution, the Sharon government has effectively hijacked
“separation”—originally a Labor Party idea—to serve its own
political agenda, namely, a state of bantustans on some 42
percent of the West Bank. Avraham Bendor, a former head of the
General Security Services, says that “instead of creating a
reality of separation and maintaining a window of opportunity
for ‘two states for two peoples’…this window of opportunity is
gradually closing. The Palestinians are arguing: you
wanted two states, and instead you are closing us up in an
[apartheid-era] South African reality. Therefore, the
more we support the fence, they lose their dream and hope for
an independent Palestinian state.”[29]

From a Likud
perspective, imposition of such a state is justified on the
grounds that Israel will require strategic depth to defend
itself, in the form of “security zones” in the coastal
regions, around Jerusalem and an Israeli presence along the
Jordan
river. The senior
IDF command reportedly no longer believes that a two-state
outcome along the Geneva contours is sufficient to resolve the
conflict. The IDF brass hints that a future deal will need to
be based on a regional understanding, shorthand for a
Jordanian-Palestinian federation wherein
Jordan absorbs the land from which
Israel agrees to withdraw and the vast
population that inhabits that land.This, as Uzi Benziman
notes, is the same policy prescription of the extreme right.[30]

But it seems highly questionable that the
Palestinians will agree to anything less than the territorial
parameters of the unfinished Taba negotiations of January
2001, which spoke of dividing
Jerusalem and land ceded by
Israel in exchange for any settlements retained.
As chief PA negotiator Saeb Erekat wrote, “It has become clear
to many Palestinians that what Mr. Sharon and many other
Israelis have in mind for the Palestinians is a ghetto ‘state’
surrounded by Israeli settlements, with no ability to defend
itself, deprived of water resources and arable land, with an
insignificant presence in Jerusalem and sovereign in name
only. Palestinians will never accept such a future. Nor should
we.”[31] Likewise, it seems
unlikely that Jordan will sacrifice the Hashemite entity it
has actively consolidated since 1988. It is also extremely
unlikely that the international community will indulge a
redrawing of an internationally recognized border. As Benziman
says, these IDF assessments open up space for debate over
alternatives to the two-state outcome.[32]

Demography

Due to Sharon’s refusal to pursue negotiations, many
prominent two-staters believe, time for a two-state solution
is running out. Sari Nusseibeh and Ami Ayalon, respectively a
Palestinian and an Israeli who seek popular endorsement of a
set of basic principles for a permanent status accommodation,
voice this concern. Key supporters of the Geneva Accord such
as David Kimche harness the worry to promote their own
initiative, arguing that opponents of the accord will lead
Israel down the path to a binational state.[33]

Joint Palestinian/Israeli demonstration at the wall in Abu
Dis. (Yoav Lemmer/AFP)

Inside the Israeli establishment,
former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, army chief of staff Moshe
Yaalon and four past heads of the security services echo the
fear that government indecision may see
Israel slide into a binational reality. Deputy
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, a Likud member, surprised many
observers when he concurred:

We don’t have unlimited time. More and
more Palestinians are uninterested in a negotiated, two-state
solution, because they want to change the essence of the
conflict from an Algerian paradigm to a South African one.
From a struggle against “occupation,” in their parlance, to a
struggle for one man, one vote. That is, of course, a much
cleaner struggle, a much more popular struggle—and ultimately
a much more powerful one. For us, it would mean the end of the
Jewish state.[34]

Olmert’s remarks hint at the extent to
which demography, rather than coexistence, has come to
underpin the Zionist case for disengagement.
Haifa University’s Arnon Sofer argues that the total
population west of the
Jordan will reach 15.5 million by 2020. The 6.4
million Jews will constitute only 40 percent of the
population; the majority will be 8.8 million Palestinian
Arabs. Sofer contends that demographic parity between Jews and
Arabs already exists, if
Israel’s non-Jewish, non-Arab residents are
excluded from the count.[35] Such calculations led
Barak’s chief negotiator, Gilead Sher, to call on Israelis to
“define our borders by ourselves and place an iron wall
against the demographic threat” posed to the Jewish majority
between the Mediterranean and the
Jordan.[36] The
West
Bank barrier is
widely supported as such an iron
wall.

The right, including
Sharon, has long pooh-poohed the “demographic
threat,” arguing that immigration (aliyah) will sustain
the Jewish demographic advantage. But these assumptions fly in
the face of the reality. Not only are there insufficient
aliyah reservoirs, as the head of the Jewish Agency,
Sali Merridor (himself a settler), recently confessed,[37] but some 210,000
Israeli Jews have reportedly left the country since the fall
of 2000.[38] Ehud Olmert’s comments
confirm that the right is mindful of the demographic threat.
Olmert supports a sweeping unilateral disengagement from 80
percent of the West Bank and all of
Gaza, in order to retain a Jewish democracy.
Explaining the sudden prominence of the demographic issue, one
journalist suggests that “the silent majority has by now grown
familiar with the term ‘demographic threat’ and learned what
it means.

Today most
Israelis can say: we’ve seen the future, and it doesn’t
work.”[39] Fear of losing a Jewish majority and
facing a binational reality brings together a range of Israeli
actors from both the left and the right wings. In a
dialectical fashion, the ongoing diplomatic stalemate and the
rise of the demographic discourse could serve to heighten the
Israeli sense that Israel must swiftly and decisively move to
extract itself from a quagmire. The results of the Likud
members’ poll may well indicate that it will not be possible
to do so under the current configuration of the Knesset, whose
term ends in 2007.

Demography and the
Extremes

Though proponents of separation, either
negotiated or unilateral, may win the demographic argument, it
is not evident that the Israeli public will adopt their
prognosis. The Israeli right, which initially opposed the
“separation barrier” in the West Bank, embraced the idea as a
result of public pressure, but altered the route to maximize
Israeli territorial control. The hazard of the demographic
argument, and indeed using binationalism as a scarecrow, is
that they may increase support for ethnic cleansing or
institutionalized discrimination against non-Jews. As David
Landau, editor of the daily Haaretz, puts it, “While
the peace camp hopes that the very real and frightening
demographic scenario will convince the settlers to finally
sober up—lest the entire Zionist enterprise find itself in
mortal danger—the rightists hope that this same demographic
threat will convince the whole of
Israel to join their ranks.” [40] Veteran peace activist
Uri Avnery warns against using talk of inevitable
binationalism to “frighten Arab-hating Israelis. They see it
only as another reason to put up more settlements all over the
West
Bank.”[41] Settler leader Israel
Harel, indeed, claims that once the Arab minority inside
Israel reaches 40 percent the state will no
longer be a Jewish state. Harel adds that once
Israel has “run away” from the
Occupied Territories, the demographic pressure will intensify
as Palestinian refugees are resettled there.[42]

Veteran peace activist Uri Avnery warns
against using talk of inevitable binationalism to “frighten
Arab-hating Israelis. They see it only as another reason to
put up more settlements all over the West Bank.”[41] Settler leader Israel
Harel, indeed, claims that once the Arab minority inside
Israel reaches 40 percent the state will no
longer be a Jewish state. Harel adds that once
Israel has “run away” from the
Occupied Territories, the demographic pressure will intensify
as Palestinian refugees are resettled there.[42] Though Harel refrains
from proposing a solution to his demographic problem, he hints
that Zionism has not relied on miracles, but has created them.
What miracle he wants to create is unclear, but it is not a
two-state solution.

Demographic trends raise the temptation
to refuse compromise and consider radical measures. The
demographic obsession also threatens the precarious relations
between the Jewish majority and Palestinian citizens of
Israel. Leading Labor party leaders support
moving the town of Umm al-Fahm, an Arab town in
Israel, to the future Palestinian state. Dani
Mor, a left-wing supporter of moving communities inhabited by
Palestinian citizens of
Israel to the future Palestinian entity, notes
that whoever supports equal rights for all citizens must
support measures to ensure that the majority of the country’s
citizens are Jews. According to Mor, equal rights for non-Jews
will only be assured when there is no threat to the Jewish
character of the state. Residents of Umm al-Fahm who wish to
stay in Israel could move elsewhere in the country.[43] Commenting on such
ideas, Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin notes, “The peace discourse of the
Israeli left in fact proposes getting rid of Arabs, and
therefore it sounds exactly like the talk of transfer.”[44] Support for less
subtle forms of transfer—forced expulsion or migration induced
by material incentives—peaked at 57 percent in a national
survey conducted in 2003, while 46 percent of Israelis
supported enforced "transfer" of Palestinians residing in the
Occupied Territories, and 33 percent supported the transfer
of Palestinians who hold Israeli citizenship.[45]

Ironies of
Stalemate

Talk of one-state options has not yet
overcome the powerful currents that favor separation and the
two-state solution. But the longer the diplomatic stalemate
and settlement expansion proceed unabated, the more
disillusioned Israelis and Palestinians will become with the
land-sharing formula.

The two-state solution will certainly
become increasingly discredited among Palestinians if there is
no serious diplomatic process. For some Palestinians, the
failure of the PA between 1994 and 2000 to develop credible
and transparent institutions contributed to a sense that the
Oslo years “proved the [Palestinian]
nationalist goal unattainable.”[46] The two-state solution
is also associated with the Palestinian ruling class, viewed
by many Palestinians as corrupt and inept. The availability of
vast sums of international aid created a rentier state in
which the dependent PA elites failed to develop a rapport with
their constituency. So far, the Palestinian mainstream
refrains from endorsing one-state ideas out of consideration
for the besieged Arafat and how much the PA invested in a
negotiated two-state solution. But even in the mainstream,
there are hints of a radical rethinking. Prominent Fatah
leader Qaddura Faris claims that he has been approached to
form a party promoting a one-state solution. Faris suggests
that because Palestinians “have been left without any hope…we
are seeking any path—even annexation to
Israel—in other words to win [Palestinian
rights] by using the vehicle of democracy.”[47]

Ironically, the beginnings of eroded
support for the two-state solution among secular nationalist
Palestinians may induce
Israel to look toward Hamas as its preferred
partner. Though Israelis view Hamas as a proponent of a single
Islamic state and, therefore, committed to
Israel’s obliteration, others disagree, citing
numerous Hamas statements over the years accepting a two-state
solution in exchange for a long-term hudna (ceasefire).
A further irony is that, of all the Palestinian factions, the
Islamist movement has perhaps the most to lose in a secular or
binational state. Given both the declining standing of the PA
and the growing popularity of Hamas, Fatah entrepreneurs may
come to view demands for a binational or secular state as a
marker to distinguish their movement from other political
players. Still another irony is that the increasingly frequent
use of the demographic argument in internal Israeli discourse
may, in fact, encourage Palestinians to view the demand for a
vote within a unitary entity as increasingly attractive. The
Israeli demographic debate reinforces thinking about the
conflict as a zero-sum game in which
Israel’s greatest “weakness” is the
Palestinians’ greatest advantage.

Steady Erosion

Writing in 1998, Azmi Bishara predicted,
“When it becomes fully apparent that an independent and
democratic state occupying every inch of the
West
Bank and Gaza
Strip free of Israeli settlements is not realizable, it will
be time for Palestinians to reexamine the entire strategy. We
will then begin to discuss a binational state solution.”[48]

History
and Israeli actions might well have vindicated him. For almost
two decades, Meron Benvenisti has also warned that, at some
point, Israeli expansion would pass the point of no return,
beyond which implementation of a two-state solution is not
possible. In reply to this hypothesis, the scholar Ian Lustick
suggested that the issue at stake was not “facts on the
ground,” but rather “facts in people’s minds.”[49] Borrowing from the prison writings of
Antonio Gramsci, Lustick argued that processes of state
expansion were reversible, especially if the territory in
question is not widely accepted as an integral part of the
metropolis. He offered the examples of French disengagement
from Algeria and Irish independence, granted by
Britain, as evidence. But there is no sea
separating Israel and Palestine, and counter-claims on the territory of
the Israeli metropolis have not disappeared. Lustick also
failed to appreciate what impact the “facts on the ground”
would have on the calculations of the Palestinians in regard
to supporting the two-state outcome. These facts have, over
time, undermined the very notion of the two-state deal that
Lustick deems desirable and inevitable.

While the debate over the “final status”
of the conflict between
Israel and the Palestinians is far from
resolved, the legitimacy, basis and support for separation
between the two peoples is steadily being eroded, primarily by
unilateral Israeli actions. Theoretically, this process can be
reversed, but at present there does not appear to be an
Israeli, Palestinian or international leader who can alter the
trend. It is worth recalling that the two-state idea itself is
not deep-rooted, only becoming salient for Palestinians and
Israelis after 1988 and only becoming the conventional wisdom
in the 1990s. Could the two-state solution be judged
unattainable before another ten years pass?

One
thing is certain: the binational state will not emerge because
Meron Benvenisti or Qaddura Faris set up a party and
campaigned for one. Rather, it will come about because
separation is discredited and impossible. As Israeli
journalist Aluf Benn perceptively notes, in the wake of
the Likud referendum, “talk has shifted to the left, the
reality to the right, and the gap between them has only grown
wider.”[50] The two-state outcome is far from
being the inevitable solution to the conflict, and it may well
plunge into that crack between discourse and
reality.

يتوجب ملاحقة المستوطنين
علي أعمالهم الإجرامية بحق الفلسطينيين

2005/08/15

جدعون ليفي

ليس بسبب
أقوالهم التحريضية التي تثير البعض في إسرائيل
الكفاح ضد
التحريض هو ملجأ للجبان الذي يخشى من مهاجمة المحرضين بسبب
أعمالهم الظالمة الحقيقية التي ينفذونها. كفاح المستشار القضائي
للحكومة، ميني مزوز، ضد تحويل التحريض إلي مخالفة جماعية، هو
كفاح هام للحفاظ علي حرية التعبير في إسرائيل. مزوز لا يستحق
الهجمات الانتقادية التي وجهت إليه إثر تصريحاته حول غياب الصلة
القانونية الأكيدة بين التحريض الذي سبق اغتيال رابين وبين
القتل، وان المحرضين من اليمين يستحقون الشجب والتنديد، ولكن ليس
إلي درجة تقديمهم للمحاكمة. هم جديرون بالتقديم للمحاكمة فقط علي
خلفية أعمالهم الظالمة التي يقومون بها ـ وهي أكثر من أن تحصي ـ
وليس بسبب أفكارهم وأقوالهم.
ولكن في إسرائيل المذعورة من قبل
المستوطنين لا يقدمون أفراد اليمين للمحاكمة بسبب أعمالهم
الشريرة والعنيفة. عدد الأشخاص الذين يطالبون بتقديم الحاخام
الفلاني الذي قال أمورا حادة ضد رئيس الوزراء أكثر بكثير من
أولئك الذين يطالبون بتقديم مستوطن أطلق النار علي طفل
للقضاء.
وعلي وجه العموم لا يكفي التحريض وحده للوصول إلي
مرحلة القتل. عندما نعتوا في اليسار شارون بـ القاتل بعد حرب
لبنان لم يخطر ببال أحد في حينه أن يمس به بسبب ذلك.
الحقيقة
هي وجوب الشعور بالأسف لحقيقة أن اليمين وحده هو الذي يمارس
التحريض. فقد كان من الأفضل له إفاقة اليسار من غفوته الطويلة
التي ألمت به واستخدم سلاح التحريض هو الآخر. خسارة أن أحدا
عندنا لا يحرض ضد شرطة الهجرة المتجبرة بالضعفاء، وخسارة أن
اليسار لا يحرض ضد وحدات التصفية في المناطق وضد الجنود الذين
ينكلون بالفلسطينيين في الحواجز وضد حرس الحدود الذين يطلقون
النار علي الأطفال والمتظاهرين غير المسلحين وغير العنيفين، وضد
عناصر الشاباك الذين يعذبون المعتقلين وضد الجنود الذين يدمرون
المنازل. خسارة أن أحدا عندنا لم يعد يحرض ضد المستوطنين قتلة
الزيتون ومدمري الكروم ولصوص الأراضي. خسارة انه لا توجد هنا
حملة مجابهة حقيقية ضد كل من أصيب بداء الحرب وهوس
الاحتلال.
الصرعة الرائجة الآن هي انتقاد اليمين بسبب
التحريض. كل متحدث يهاجم فك الارتباط بشدة ويؤيد رفض الأوامر
يشتبه بأنه قد ارتكب هذه المخالفة الرائجة الآن، وعندما يحجم
المستشار القضائي عن تقديمه للمحاكمة ـ اليسار يتصنع الغضب وعدم
الرضي. علي سبيل المثال رئيس حركة شينوي، يوسف لبيد، يشعر
بالصدمة من تحريضات الحاخامات، ولكنه لم يتأثر في أي مرة من
المرات من أعمال المستوطنين والجنود. هذا تصرف جبان ورعديد يصدر
عمن يخشى تقديم لائحة الاتهام الحقيقية. يتوجب أن يُقدم للقضاء
كل من نفذوا الأعمال المقيتة الإجرامية مثل قتل مئات الفلسطينيين
الأبرياء خلال السنوات الأربع الماضية باسم دولة إسرائيل، وليس
الحاخامات المتطرفين.

من
الذي لم يُتهم بهذه المخالفة الفظيعة خلال الأشهر الأخيرة؟ رجال
الشرطة أرسلوا إلي جنازة المخرب عيدن بن زاده حتى يمنعوا
التحريض. الجنود الذين يتصدون للمتظاهرين ضد الجدار في بلعين
قالوا أنهم سمعوا هتافات تحريضية في المظاهرات، والمسئولون عن بث
برنامج التحريض الديني في التلفاز اعتبروا محرضين ومثلهم من
قاموا بإلصاق شعار شارون ديكتاتور علي السيارات. حتى المطرب موكي
الذي دعا إلي تحطيم عظام المستوطنين اتهم بالتحريض. كل موقف حاد
ومتطرف يحظى مباشرة بالمطالبة المتكلفة بالتقديم للمحاكمة،
والمستشار القضائي وحده هو الذي يقف في عتبة الباب ويحول دون
تقديم لوائح الاتهام. مزوم قد يكون الجندي الأخير الذي يدافع عن
حرية الرأي والتعبير.
الكلمات لا تقتل. ومن المسموح اتخاذ
مواقف متطرفة والتنديد بالمواقف غير الأخلاقية، ولكن ليس إلي
درجة التقديم للمحاكمة. فالتحريض الأكثر شدة وحدة عندنا لا يمارس
أصلا ضد شارون أو فك الارتباط وإنما ضد العرب ومع ذلك لا نسمع
الاقتراحات المتكررة صبح مساء بتقديم كاتبي شعار الموت للعرب
الذي يزين البلاد طولا وعرضا، للمحاكمة، ولكن هؤلاء العنصريين
المقيتين أيضا لا يستحقون المحاكمة. علي المجتمع أن يلفظهم من
داخله وليس تقديمهم للمحاكمة. لا يتوجب تقديم حاخام صفد العنصري
شموئيل الياهو الذي دعا لعدم تأجير الشقق للعرب وكل ما يتوجب
فعله هو نبذه والتنديد به. من يريد أن يخوض الكفاح فعلا، عليه أن
يندد بالعنصرية التي تكشفت في جهاز القضاء من قبل إن تتشبث
بعناصر اليمين الغريبة الأطوار. ولكــن ذلك كله يتطلب الجرأة
والشجاعة.
الاتهام بالتحريض هو في العادة وسيلة من وسائل
الأنظمة الظلامية التي تشكل شرطة لمتابعة أفكار الناس. في البلاد
63 مواطنا أثيوبيا يطلبون اللجوء السياسي لان بلادهم قد تقدمهم
للمحاكمة بتهمة التحريض، والحكم قد يصل إلي حد الإعدام، فهل تريد
إسرائيل أن تصبح مثل هذه الأنظمة؟
يتوجب السماح للمستوطنين
بأن يشنوا معركتهم الأخيرة البائسة والعدمية وان تتاح أمامهم
فرصة التنفيس عن أفكارهم العنيفة والمتطرفة. وجههم الحقيقي كُشف
وهو يستحق التنديد، ولكن الضرر الذي أحدثوه يكمن في أفعالهم وليس
في أقوالهم. ليدعوا للرفض كما يحلو لهم، وليقدم الرافضون
للمحاكمة، وليدعوا للعنف ومن ثم ليقدم العنيفون للمحاكمة، ولكن
أعمال المستوطنين، هذا الجمهور غير الأخلاقي لكونه جمهورا
استيطانيا سيطر علي ارض ليست له، كافية للتقديم للمحاكمة، أما
أفكارهم وأقوالهم فغير جديرة بالاهتمام.

جدعون
ليفي
كاتب رئيسي في الصحيفة
(هآرتس)
14/8/2005

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